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CASE COMMENTS

From a mechanical standpoint, both motion to dismiss and motion
for more definite statement can of course be made for the sole purpose
of delay, with no valid expectation that either will be granted. Ruling
on the former, however, can promptly be postponed until trial, whereupon the ten days for answering begin to run. The latter motion, on
the other hand, requires disposal before the proceeding can continue.
If allowed, it protects the movant as to time; he has ample time within
which to answer the more nearly definite complaint, which must be
filed within ten days of the grant of the motion. If it is denied, he
has only himself to blame if he is idle in the meantime. It is submitted
that the elimination of the use of this motion for dilatory purposes is .a
step in the right direction.
Despite the possible implications of the instant opinion, as distinct
from the obviously correct decision, the logical conclusion is that
motion to dismiss alters the period within which responsive pleading
must be entered, but that motion for more definite statement does not.
ROLAND

F.

CimBs

EVIDENCE: ADMISSIBILITY OF CRIMINAL CONVICTION TO
ESTABLISH TRUTH OF FACTS IN CIVIL PROCEEDING
Stevens v. Duke, 42 So.2d 861 (Fla.1949)
In a civil action for damages, defendant offered in evidence a
certified copy of the county court's record showing plaintiffs conviction of a violation of Florida traffic laws arising out of his participation
in the accident involved in the instant proceeding. The trial court
excluded this evidence. On appeal from judgment for plaintiff, Hm.,
a prior criminal conviction is inadmissible in evidence in a subsequent
civil proceeding to establish the truth of the facts upon which it was
rendered. Judgment affirmed.
The rule followed in this case originated at common law.1 It is
13, to which discussion the reader is referred in 31 F.S.A. 100 (1950), relating to
FLA. EQ. R. 33.

12 Fnx

, JuuoMENTs 653 (1925).
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still accepted by most courts, 2 notwithstanding the theoretically high
probative value of a criminal conviction, which must be based upon
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The emphasis in this rule is on
the purpose for which such a conviction is presented and on its
relevancy. When the criminal conviction arises out of the same
circumstances involved in the civil proceeding, it is generally admissible if relevant and offered as a mere evidentiary fact. 3 A plea
of guilty is also acceptable as an admission; 4 so is its close relative,
the plea of nolo contendere, although the latter is usually taken as an
implied confession rather than as a true admission. 5 In the instant
case the Court took the position that the proffered evidence failed to
qualify as an exception to the rule of exclusion. The introduction
of a criminal conviction to establish the truth of facts alleged is
permitted in certain circumstances, however, and a few jurisdictions
are extending the exceptions to this rule of exclusion.(
The jurisdictions following this rule base their holdings on a
variety of rationales; no dominant single factor is present among the
decisions. One basis is the familiar principle of law that a criminal
conviction normally involves different parties and therefore is not
res judicata in a subsequent civil proceeding.7 Another objection
frequently raised is the failure of a judgment of conviction to meet
the requirements of the hearsay rule as regards the allegations of
fact in the civil proceeding; by its very nature the conviction is
2

E.g., Warren v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 215 N.C. 402, 2 S.E.2d 17 (1939);
Goodwin v. Continental Casualty Co., 175 Okla. 469, 53 P.2d 241 (1935);
Interstate Dry Goods Stores v. Williamson, 91 W. Va. 156, 112 S.E. 301 (1922).
3
E.g., In re Welansky, 319 Mass. 205, 65 N.E.2d 202 (1946) (prior relevant
conviction admissible in disbarment proceedings, though not conclusive).
4
Greenfield v. Tuccillo, 129 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1942) (admissible as prima
facie evidence of the facts); Olson v. Meacham, 129 Cal. App. 670, 19 P.2d 527
(1933).
5
Camminetti v. Imperial Mut. Life Ins. Co., 59 Cal. App.2d 476, 139 P.2d 681,
689 (1943); Esarey v. Buhner Fertilizer Co., 117 Ind. App. 291, 69 N.E.2d 755,
757 (1946); Commonwealth ex. rel. Warner v. Warner, 156 Pa. Super. 465, 40

A.2d
886 (1945).
6
E.g., AmERICAN

INsTiTuTE, MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE §521 (1942); 5
§§1346, 1671a (1940); see notes 10-14 infra.
Ceneral Exchange Ins. Corp. v. Shelby, 165 Md. 1, 165 At. 809 (1933);
Young v. Davis, 174 Miss. 435, 164 So. 586 (1935); Seidman v. Seidman, 53 R.L
196, 164 At. 194 (1938); Interstate Dry Goods Stores v. Williamson, 91 W. Va.
156, 112 S.E. 301 (1922).
841 HAv. L. REV. 241, 244 (1927).
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secondary evidence of the facts." This argument, however, applies
to the introduction of any type of judgment. Still another objection
to the admission of a conviction is the fact that acquittals are uniformly
excluded; accordingly, lack of mutuality is advanced as an argument.9
An acquittal, however, results from failure to establish guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt; whereas a preponderance of the evidence is all
that is required for a civil verdict. T he quantum of requisite evidence
is therefore not the same, and a distinction is justified. Other -courts
base the rule of exclusion upon the differences as a whole in civil and
criminal proceedings in -regard to the burden of proof and rules of
evidence. This basis is invalid and illogical, since the standards for
conviction of crimes are even more stringent than those applied to
civil verdicts. 10
Eagle Star and British Insurance Co. v. Heller"' contains one of
the strongest opinions rejecting, the rule of exclusion. Plaintiffs conviction of arson was admitted as conclusive of the facts in an action
for recovery of fire insurance, thereby barring plaintiff's action.
Almost all c6urts, however, that do allow this type of evidence to be
admitted adopt a less extreme view. New York, for example, in
Schindler v. Royal Insurance Co.,' 2 admitted a prior conviction, but
only as prima facie evidence of the facts in question.1 3 Other jurisdictions are reluctant to lend a particular positive weight to a con14
viction and merely admit it for whatever it may be worth to the jury.
The decisions that break with the rule of exclusion involve for the
most part a prior conviction of the plaintiff. It may well be that the
judiciary is motivated by its traditional aversion to permitting a
wrongdoer to succeed in a civil proceeding despite or even because
of his misdeed.
In actual practice, the rule of exclusion achieves a desirable result
9New York &
Cuba Mail S.S. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 32 F. bupp. 2o1
(S.D.N.Y. 1940); Wirt v. Fraser, 158 Fla. 777, 30 So.2d 174 (1947); State v.
Dubose, 152 Fla. 304, 11 So.2d 477 (1943); Montgomery v. Crm, 199 Ind. 660,
688, 161 N.E. 251, 261 (1928); Silva v. Silva, 297 Mass. 217, 7 N.E.2d 601

(1937); Ashby v. Red Jacket Coal Corp;, 185 Va. 202, 38 S.E.2d 436 (1946).

10 E.g., Wolff v. Employers Fire Ins. Corp., 282 Ky. 824, 140 S.W.2d 640

(1940).
11149 Va. 82, 140 S.E. 814 (1927). But cf. Rhine v. Bond, 159 Va. 279, 165
S.E. 515 (1932).
12258 N.Y. 310, 179 N.E. 711 (1932).
l 3 Accord, Sovereign Camp W. 0. W. v. Gunn, 227 Ala. 400, 150 So. 491
(1933); North River Ins. Co. v. Militello, 100 Colo. 343, 67 P.2d 625 (1937).
14Wolff v. Employers Fire Ins. Corp., 282 Ky. 824, 140 S.W.2d 640 (1940)Rostron v. Rostron, 49 ILL 292,.142 At. 162 (1928).
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